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Abstract: 
The paper presents an analysis of the trade-offs of participants of different type between payment 
delay and liquidity requirement on the basis of synthetically generated data. The generation of the 
synthetic transaction data set for a simple RTGS system is described and calibrated using real world 
parameters. The payment system is simulated for various liquidity levels and it is shown that 
participants of different size in terms of transaction volume and value will have different optimal 
liquidity requirements, as the payment delays they face for each liquidity level will be different. This 
is shown using indifference curves between payment delay and liquidity requirements. 
JEL classification: C15, C5, E58, L14, L41, L51. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the start of the current financial crisis and in the context of initiatives aimed at enhancing macro-
prudential supervision of the financial system such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the 
interest of monetary policy decision makers in quantitative analysis of inter-bank large value payment 
flows for the purpose of financial stability analysis has increased substantially. Payment systems data 
may be considered one of the key sources of quantitative analysis for macro prudential purposes as 
this data is available almost in real-time and in high quality. However, research into this data is 
relatively recent and the contributions of such research have been limited to the understanding of only 
a few financial markets, such as the overnight money market. Market infrastructures and in particular 
large value payment systems have long been an important focus of central bank activities, because of 
their importance for any well-functioning financial system and for the implementation of the monetary 
policy. Yet even for the more narrow applications within the oversight and operation of payment 
systems, there remains much room for the establishment of new quantitative tools. Simulations of 
payment systems are a very promising way of gaining a deeper understanding of the payments data 
and are therefore of interest for payment systems operations and oversight specifically and for the 
quantitative analysis of payments data in general.
1 
While publications on payment system simulations are relatively recent, there is a growing body of 
literature on the topic. Starting with seminal papers on systemic risk in payment systems, such as 
Angelini, Maresca and Russo (1996), publications of quantitative analyses have evolved. Among the 
first major contributions in the field of quantitative simulations, which established this field and led to 
many other papers using similar tools and methodology were Koponen and Soramäki (1998) and 
Leinonen and Soramäki (1999). The tools which were developed have since been extended and 
enriched. They also form the basis of the analytical parts of this paper. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we describe a set-up for the analysis of payment system 
issues based on synthetically generated transaction and participant data and simulation tools. To our 
knowledge, there are currently no simulation publications based on fully synthetically generated data. 
Generated data allows the researcher to determine the data generating process and may even include 
behavioural assumptions. Publications on transaction data generation for payment systems simulations 
are very recent, with Docherty (2010) being the only available dedicated contribution so far. The 
findings in this study are partly based on the fact that the composition of the participant community 
and their inter-linkages can be controlled via the data generation process. 
                                                      
1 The link between payment systems oversight and wider financial stability analysis becomes also clear from the mandate of 
the oversight function. As stated in the Eurosystem Oversight Report 2009 (p. 9), “oversight aims at ensuring the safety 
and efficiency of the overseen systems in order to contribute to financial stability and maintain public confidence in the 
currency”. 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1291
February 2011
Second, using the established framework, we identify how decisions regarding the design and rules of 
a payment system may influence the competitive situation of banks participating in a payment system. 
This serves as an example for the fact that simulations can be used in order to gain information for 
solidly quantitative assessments. Concretely, the decision analysed in this paper is changing the 
liquidity requirements in a simple real-time gross settlement system. Such liquidity requirements are 
important in systems with liquidity saving mechanisms which may achieve significant liquidity 
savings on the one hand, but also introduce payment delays and therefore credit or liquidity risks to the 
system and its participants on the other. In fact, there is in all payment systems a trade-off between 
liquidity requirement and immediacy of payment settlement or payment delay. Simulations
2 reveal that 
different types of participants are likely to have different preferences regarding this trade-off. Large 
participants will prefer low liquidity requirements as they will be able to minimise payment delays by 
liquidity recycling due to their higher number of payments. Smaller participants will hardly benefit 
from lower liquidity requirements as they will in many cases need to fully fund their few daily 
transactions by raising their account balances or pledging collateral in order to avoid damaging 
payment delays, due to the fact that they only have few transactions per day. The steepness of the 
trade-off between liquidity need and payment delay depends on the pattern of payments among and 
between the different groups of similarly sized participants. Different types of participants will have 
different optimal levels for liquidity requirements, derived in this paper with the help of curves of 
indifference between combinations of liquidity requirement and payment delay. There may be 
intentionally or unintentionally hidden, unfair discrimination against certain types of participants 
inherent in the choices made with respect to certain design features of a payment system, just like a 
non-tariff trade barrier may be a hidden inhibition to international trade. The knowledge and 
quantification of such effects may alter the assessment of the overseer compared to an assessment 
which does not make use of simulation techniques. 
In the course of this paper, a number of research questions related to the use of simulations for 
oversight and operational purposes will be answered, including which purposes payment systems 
simulations can serve, which payments data is available and what are advantages of using artificially 
generated data for simulations. Regarding the latter, the paper highlights which key parameters need to 
be calibrated in the data generation process and how close the generated data comes to real data. 
Furthermore, it is an important question how the effects of system design changes on payment system 
participants can be illustrated and measured, why large and small payment system participants can 
have very different preferences for the design of the system and why should this be of concern to an 
overseer of the system. In section 2 of the remainder of this paper, the purposes of simulations are 
presented and the literature on payment system simulation reviewed. Section 3 describes the data 
generation and calibration of the process. Section 4 presents the results of the various simulations and 
discussion of the findings before section 5 concludes. 
                                                      
2 For the simulations, we use the Payment Systems Simulator 2 developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF PSS2). 7
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2. Purposes of simulations and literature review 
The aim of quantitative analyses in the field of payment systems is to gain insight into their 
functioning, the inherent risks and the efficiency. Electronic payment systems store huge amounts of 
data in efficient data warehouses. These databases should produce a favourable environment for 
quantitative analyses. Yet, while the use of payments data employing statistical methods and tools is 
well-established, analytical tools regarding the behaviour and preferences of participants and system 
owners are scarce. This is because the characteristics of large value payment system are very diverse. 
Most payment systems exhibit a large number of transactions among a community of participants, 
which can vary from very large to small. Especially large participant communities will exhibit a high 
degree of heterogeneity. Participants may be large or small banks, public or private banks, wholesale 
or retail banks, non-bank financial intermediaries such as insurances, central securities deposits, 
central counter parties, central banks and a wide variety of ancillary systems. Participants may hold 
one or more accounts which they may or may not manage centrally. The transactions between the 
participants can vary in volume and value, in their intraday pattern or over time. Systems will have 
different liquidity provision mechanism, collateral policies, intraday credit limit arrangements, 
bilateral limit facilities, multilateral limit facilities, liquidity bridges or liquidity management tools. 
Systems will vary in their ways of achieving settlement of payment transactions and in which asset 
they settle transactions, commercial bank money or central bank money. And finally, the pricing 
structure and access criteria may be very different from one system to the other. 
Modern large value payment systems come in two major varieties, real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
systems and deferred net settlement (DNS) systems.
3 Since the 1980s, for their wholesale large value 
fund transfer systems, or inter-bank payment systems, most countries have introduced RTGS systems. 
These systems mostly settle in central bank money and all payments are settled immediately upon 
submission to the payment system. However, to avoid situations of gridlock and to optimise liquidity 
usage, all major systems have additional features. Many systems have additional settlement algorithms 
such as queuing or splitting algorithms, but also different submission or ending algorithms, intraday 
net-settlement and settlement of ancillary systems.  
The present paper builds on several strands of the existing literature on large-value payment systems. 
The main strands, which are described below, are (1) literature formally modelling payment 
transactions, (2) applied quantitative literature including simulations on real historical data, and (3) the 
limited literature on payments data generation. 
Regarding  (1), the literature which formally models payment transactions and systems including 
publications by Edward Green, such as Fujiki, Green and Yamazaki (2008), or Neil Wallace, such as 
Wallace (2000). Such models allow, for example, modelling the behaviour of participants in a 
payment system. 
                                                      
3 Between RTGS and DNS systems, many hybrids are possible, such as Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) Systems, which do 
not only settle net at a specific point in time but whenever new payment entries create possibilities to settle payments via 
netting, which is very similar to what queuing achieves in RTGS systems. 8
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This paper follows a different strand of the literature, referred to above under (2), which uses simulation 
tools which are able to replicate the design of existing or fictitious payment systems. The plethora of data 
and parameters make analytical solutions for more complex systems and data sets difficult.
4 In such 
circumstances, numerical simulations can help to perform quantitative analyses. Besides the payments 
data, a tool is required, which can replicate the settlement process of a payment system as closely as 
possible and which allows, ideally, for the introduction of the various design features of payment 
systems. A widely accepted tool for this purpose is the Payment System Simulator 2 developed by the 
Bank of Finland. It allows simulating most types of large value payment systems and many other 
payment systems, also in combinations of several systems or with securities settlement systems. 
Simulations can be of interest for all parties concerned by payment systems, i. e. providers/operators, 
participants and oversight authorities. From their different perspectives all three will essentially be 
interested in the safety and the efficiency of each payment system. For example, payment system providers 
might be interested in the effects of changes in the pricing structure, in the enhancement of business 
continuity and crisis management or the support of the functional evolution and settlement efficiency. 
Before the 1990s, most payment systems settled daily, so the intraday perspective was widely covered 
in the literature as it is now.
5 Since the lack of an intraday perspective makes analytical solutions to the 
exposures between the participants rather simple, quantitative analyses and simulations were of less 
interest. In addition, information technology was not yet advanced enough to perform large-scale 
simulations. A wider body of literature with payment system simulation studies can be found from the 
mid-nineties onwards (Bowman, 1995 and McAndrews and Wasilyew, 1995). With the growing 
importance of RTGS systems since the early 1980s (in 1985 3 central banks had adopted RTGS 
systems, in 2006 already more than 90), these systems became the choice of central banks in 
developed countries.
6 There is an extensive and growing literature on analytical findings in the area of 
large-value payment systems. This literature covers, among other topics, the application of simulation 
tools, network analyses
7, behavioural studies
8 and experimental studies. Simulation tools, and in 
particular the Payment System Simulator 2 of the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS2) have been applied to a 
range of topics, including the analysis of the effects of choices for the structure of a payment, scenario 
analyses of various critical situations or the studies on liquidity effects on the performance of the 
system and its participants (Leinonen and Soramäki, 2005). Other published applications include: 
                                                      
4 Deterministic analytical solutions, where the actions and preferences of participants could be represented in formulae, 
would be highly desirable as the major disadvantage of simulations is clearly that they cannot easily be used for 
optimisation purposes, as pointed out by Leinonen and Soramäki (2003). 
5 Manning et al. (2000) 
6 Bech and Hobijn (2006) 
7 There is a growing literature on the use of network topology as a tool to analyse financial networks. The aim in most studies 
(for a literature review see ECB Financial Stability Review 1 2010) is to identify systemically important nodes in the 
financial network concerned. 
8 Examples include agent-based modelling, such as in Arciero et al. (2008), which is designed to analyse the effects of 
behaviour of payment system participants, for example in response to a disruption at a large participant, where they might 
stop sending payments after a time of uncertainty. 9
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• Analysis of operational failures, such as the outage of the most active transfer account or bank or 
group of banks for a certain period of time, such as a business day, as in Puhr and Schmitz (2009) 
or Bedford et al. (2004). Behavioural reactions to outages by other participants were studied by 
Ledrut (2007). 
• Behavioural changes and their impact on the settlement outcomes have been analysed by 
Heijmans (2009). Such changes include changes in payment patterns and timing or changing 
payment values. 
• Studies on liquidity focus on the trade-off between liquidity saving features and their effect on the 
settlement outcome and resulting credit risks (Leinonen and Soramäki (1999). This could be due 
to changing collateral values, for example. 
• In Heijmans (2009) three scenarios of changing liquidity levels are simulated: (1) the lower bound, 
i. e. the final balance of the day can be settled, (2) the historical collateral availability and (3) the 
upper bound, i. e. all payments of the day can be settled immediately. 
Depending on the objective of the simulation study, different indicators are being used for measuring 
the outcome, such as the number of unsettled payments at the end of the day, the value of unsettled 
payments, the number of banks with unsettled payments at the end of the day
9 or the participants who 
are not capable of paying end-of-day obligations because of insufficient capital.
10 
Focussing on the data used in the above-mentioned studies, most make use of actual historical 
transaction data collected from the payment system under inspection. In Europe, this has recently 
included the TARGET2 components of Finland (e. g. Leinonen and Soramäki (1999)), The 
Netherlands (e. g. Heijmans (2009)) and Austria (e. g. Puhr and Schmitz (2009)), Italy (Arciero and 
Impenna (2001)) as well as CHAPS in the UK (Bedford et al. (2004)), Kronos in Denmark (Danmarks 
Nationalbanken (2005)) and Norwegian (Enge and Øverli (2006)) large value payment systems. A 
major project on making pan-European TARGET2 data available to the oversight and operational 
functions in the ESCB for simulations has recently concluded and publications on this basis can be 
expected in the near future. The alternative, referred to above under (3), to using historical data is 
generating data based on assumptions regarding the data generation process. This road is followed in 
this paper and has only recently also been used by Docherty and Wang (2010). Synthetic data 
generation can also be performed by sampling from an existing “historical” data set, as was done, for 
example, by Koponen and Soramäki (1998). Using synthetically generated data as opposed to 
historical data has some advantages and some drawbacks, of which we list key ones here: 
• One advantage of using artificially generated data is, according to Manning, Nier and Schanz 
(2009), the fact that behavioural changes of the payment system’s participants can be 
modelled. This is not the case when exclusively using historical data. For example, removing 
                                                      
9 See Heijmans (2009), Schmitz and Puhr (2009). 
10 See Humphrey (1986). 10
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one participant’s outgoing payments from a data set, in order to simulate the effects on the 
balances of other participants, ignores the possibility that the other participants might stop 
sending payments to the removed participants after some time, or alter their behaviour 
otherwise (see Ledrut, 2009). In other words, generated data becomes particularly interesting 
when behavioural rules are built in. 
• Another very important advantage of generated data is that no confidentiality rules need to be 
applied. In many payment systems, confidentiality rules apply to the use of the data. For 
TARGET2 this is regulated in Article 38 of the Harmonised Conditions, the contract between 
the payment system operators and the participants. While the use for oversight purposes is 
permitted, data has to be sanitised for other purposes and publications. The confidentiality 
argument has also been put forward in Docherty and Wang (2010). 
• A third advantage of synthetically generated data is the fact that generated data will be free of 
“noise” due to events external to the payment system, such as financial markets events or 
public holidays. 
• The disadvantage of using generated data, according to the Manning et al. (2009), is that the 
simulation results depend critically on the assumed data generation process. To mitigate this 
somewhat, the calibration of the data generation process should as much as possible take into 
account parameters estimated with historical data. 
One deficiency of simulations, especially those using historical data is that they ignore possible 
behavioural reactions of participants to the simulated events. Behavioural reactions are not assumed in 
Heijmans (2009) or Puhr and Schmitz (2009). Possible reactions to an outage at a major participant 
could be stop-sending rules as in Ledrut (2007) or raising available collateral. However, other 
researchers have found that such behaviour is not observed empirically for short interruptions of less 
than one day so that for short term simulations such reactions may be ignored with some justification 
(Heijmans, 2009). 
3. Data, statistical analysis and network analysis 
This paper makes use of synthetically generated data, because the available historical data is 
confidential and it is critical for the results of the study to have full information on the different types 
of participants. In the following we first describe the data generation process schematically, before 
proceeding with the calibration of the process using real historical payments data. 
Starting with the schematic overview, each payment instruction is generated individually. For the 
transaction data set of the simulation software, the necessary information is (1) a unique identifier, (2) 
a date, (3) an introduction time, (4) a sender, (5) a recipient and (6) a value of the payment. The 
following figure gives a schematic overview of the data generation. For each piece of information it 
indicates the data generation process. 11
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Figure 1 Data generation scheme 
X := (ID, Date, Time, Sender, Recipient, Value)
Running number
Pre-set








Randomised with given pre-
set distribution
Randomised with given 
distribution depending on 
Sender
Value Randomised given distribution 
depending on Sender and 
Recipient
For each transaction, data entries have to be generated
X := (ID, Date, Time, Sender, Recipient, Value)
Running number
Pre-set








Randomised with given pre-
set distribution
Randomised with given 
distribution depending on 
Sender
Value Randomised given distribution 
depending on Sender and 
Recipient
For each transaction, data entries have to be generated
 
Source: Author’s own representation 
 
In the following, we describe the data generation process of the transaction data file step-by-step (see 
also (see also Figure 2). The process is based on the sender-receiver-volume matrix which contains the 
number of payments made between each pair of participants in a certain reference period, e. g. one 
day. The payment values are given by the sender-receiver-value matrix. 
• Step 1 is the draw of the sending participant. The draw is based on the distribution of shares of 
the overall payment volume of each participant in the reference period, i. e. the vertical sum 
vector of the sender-receiver-volume matrix. 
• Step 2 is the draw of the recipient participant, which depends on the previous draw of the 
sending participant. It is based on the share of payment transaction volume of the sending 
participant to each other participant, i. e. the row vector corresponding to the sending participant. 
• Step 3 is the draw of the payment value. It depends on the previously drawn sending and 
receiving participants and is given by the value in the sender-receiver-value matrix designated 
by the pair of participants in the relationship.
11 
• Step 4 is the draw of the payment time. The distribution of payments over time can be 
determined at system-level or participant-level. 
                                                      
11 In practice, a (1,n)-row vector with a one in the place of the receiving participant and zeros otherwise is multiplied with the 
(n,n) sender-receiver-value matrix. The resulting (1,n)-row vector is multiplied with the (n,1)-column vector with a one in 
the place of the sending participant and zeros otherwise, resulting in a scalar with the payment value. 12
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Figure 2 Data Generation in four steps 
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Source: Author’s own representation 
 
The data generation procedure in this paper is different and more demanding on technical resources 
than the one in the only available published paper which elaborates specifically on the payment system 
data generation process, Docherty and Wang (2010). Since their paper generates data for a DNS 
system, it only generates bilateral exposures and not individual payments, which greatly simplifies the 
generation since the number of generated items is much smaller. In fact, only the sender receiver 
matrix needs to be generated. Papers which sample data from historical data, on the other hand, like 
Koponen and Soramäki (1998), simplify the data generation process in that they only alter an existing 
sequence of transactions more or less significantly. 
In the following second part, the calibration of the above-described data generation process with real 
historical data is described. When performing payment system simulations based on synthetically 
generated data, the assumptions of the data-generating process can be of high importance to the 
outcome of the simulation. As Manning et al. (2009, Box 3.3) propose, in order to calibrate the 
different parameters of the data generation, parameters from a real international large value payment 
system are observed and implemented in the data generation process. Docherty and Wang (2010) 
spend considerable effort on the calibration. As in this paper we are not calibrating the data to a 
specific system and participant community, we limit ourselves to a few realistic assumptions regarding 
key parameters, such as (1) the volume and (2) size of bilateral payments between the participants and 
(3) the overall timing of submitted payments. 
The volume of payments (1) in bilateral relationships between banks is assumed to be correlated to 
their respective importance in the payment system. However, there are marked differences, which can 
be seen from the table below, with data from five typical examples of individual bank-to-bank 13
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relationships taken from a European large value payment system during one week in December 2009. 
While the pair of large banks in domestic relationship 1 was transmitting thousands of payments from 
one to the other, numbers were much smaller between the pair of large banks in domestic relationships 
2 and 3, respectively. Also when looking at cross-border payments, numbers was lower. The 
relationships between large banks and small banks show far fewer payments and small banks between 
each other seem to hardly make any payments at all. They may rather be using the more advanced 
cash management systems of larger banks (as correspondent banks) and only revert to direct payments 
for special reasons. 
 
Table 1 Bilateral payment relationships between banks (one-way) 














of payments per 
day 
3816
   220 185  45  32 
Average total 
value of 
payments per day 
€5,963,385,702  €1,169,667,899 €305,566,450 €736,313,414  €37,007,861 
Average value of 
payments  €1,562,814 €5,311,843 €1,651,711  €16,435,567 €1,142,218 
Smallest payment 
value  €0  €30 €8 €5  €20 
10-percentile €123  €5,235 €342 €113 €370 
25-percentile  €775  €36,000 €1,295 €1,502 €3,098 
50-percentile 
(Median)  €4,890  €145,213 €11,110 €20,466 €29,750 
75-percentile  €30,258 €378,948 €372,039 €538,428 €138,391 
90  percentile  €266,249 €2,000,000 €1,802,874  €29,700,000  €875,706 
Largest payment 
value  €1,275,000,000 €975,007,042 €400,000,000 €340,000,000  €50,000,000 
 
The relationships between the banks in the week under consideration are evidently quite different in 
the total value transmitted, as can be seen from the table. What is more interesting is that the value of 
the payments is distributed quite differently in the selected examples. All distributions are skewed to 
the left, with the bulk of payments being rather small. The median is significantly smaller than the 14
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average in all cases. While more than half of the payments between the two large banks in domestic 
relationship 1 are below € 5,000, in domestic large-to-large relationship 3 they are more than double 
that and in domestic large-to-large relationship 2 more than half of the payments have a value 
exceeding € 140,000. Also the cross-border payments are rather large compared to the domestic ones. 
The smallest payment value recorded in the sample is 5 cents between the two banks in the domestic 
large-to-large relationship 1; the largest – also between these two banks – is 1.275 billion. The 
following figure depicts the distribution of payments between banks. It can be seen that the 
distributions for the banks in domestic relationship 2, in the international relationship and in the large-
to-small relationship (domestic relationship 4) are lognormal distributions peaking either around € 
10,000 or € 100,000. The domestic relationship 3 banks’ payment value distribution does not follow 
an approximate lognormal distribution in the period concerned. The above confirms findings by 
Soramäki et al. (2006) for Fedwire, where such lognormal distributions of the payments between 
participants were also found. 
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Source: Author’s own representation 
 
For this paper, in order to keep the data generation process manageable for ordinary computing 
power
12, we resort to rather simplified parameters for the volumes and values of bilateral payment 
relationships. Instead of taking account of different distributions, we resort to deterministic median 
payments between the participants according to the size of the sender and the receiver, respectively, 
                                                      
12 Standard Windows PC. 15
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ignoring the high deviation of payments in reality. Given that the median transaction size between 
large participants in the typical examples above ranges from approximately € 5,000 to 145,000, we 
select a value at the lower end of the range, in particular since the payment system under consideration 
is much smaller than the one from which these typical relationships were taken. The remaining 
bilateral transaction sizes between the different types of participants are assumed to be smaller than 
the median payment between large participants. 
 
Table 2 Sender-receiver-volume matrix 
Median bilateral payment (no. 
of transactions) 
Large participant  Medium participant  Small participant 
Large participant  4,000  200  30 
Medium participant  200  20  2 
Small  participant  20 2 1 
 
Table 3 Sender-receiver-value matrix (€) 
Median bilateral payment 
(€) 
Large participant  Medium participant  Small participant 
Large  participant  10,000 8,000 6,000 
Medium  participant  8,000 4,000 3,000 
Small participant  6,000  3,000  100 
 
For the generated 20,000 transactions on one business day (7:00 – 19:00), the generated totals in terms 
of volume and value are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. The tables have the senders on the right and 
the recipients on the top. The network has 150 participants, of which 10 are large banks, 30 are 
medium sized banks and the remaining 110 are small banks. For simplification, there are no ancillary 
systems connected to the payment system. 
 
Table 4 Total bilateral payments volume (No. of transactions) 
Total bilateral 
payments (no. of 
transactions) 
Large participant  Medium participant  Small participant  Grand Total 
Large participant  12,574  2,028  1,175  15,777 
Medium participant  2050  578  220  2,848 
Small Participant  760  223  392  1,375 
Grand Total  15,384  2,829  1,787  20,000 
 16
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Large participant  Medium participant  Small participant  Grand Total 
Large participant  125,712,000  16,219,000  7,044,100  148,975,100 
Medium participant  16,396,000  2,312,000  660,000  19,368,000 
Small Participant  4,560,000  669,000  39,200  5,268,200 
Grand Total  146,668,000  19,200,000  7,743,300  173,611,300 
 
In comparison to international payment systems, the concentration ratio in the example system is 
rather high, both in terms of volume and value. Only the Continuous Linked System (CLS), the 
























Concentration ratio volume Concentration ratio value




















Concentration ratio volume Concentration ratio value
Note: Concentration ratio = share of five largest participants  
Source: ECB (2008 data, 2007 for TARGET) 
 
Another important parameter for the data generation is the distribution of payments over time. The 
literature reviewed reveals quite a variety of patterns across different payment systems. 
• Van Oord and Lin (2005) find that in the Dutch System TOP, there were three peaks, at 07:00, 
09:00-11:00 and 16:00 (opening hours 07:00 – 19:00). 
                                                      
13 See ECB Bluebook (2009) 17
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• Arciero and Impenna (2001) find that in the Italian RTGS system BI-REL, there were two 
humps in mid-morning and at the end-of the day. 
• In Japan, according to Bank of Japan (2001), about 50% of all transactions (in terms of 
volume) are settled in the first hour already. 
• For Fedwire, Armantier et al. provide ample evidence of a late afternoon (15:00 – 16:00) 
maximum in the number and value of transactions.
14 
There are also systems in which the intraday payment pattern is specifically targeted by throughput 
rules. For example, in the CHAPS Sterling RTGS system in the United Kingdom, there are two 
throughput rules that stipulate that banks should make 50% of their payments by value by 12.00 and 
75% of their payments by 14.30 on average each month, measured retrospectively (Buckle and 
Campbell, 2003). While none of the studies focuses on the variation of payment patterns across size 
classes or types of participants there is no reason to believe that such patterns are the same for all. 
Indeed, especially ancillary systems may have quite different patterns from other participants such as 
commercial banks. Advanced data generation could take account of such differences. However, in 
order to make the data generation manageable with ordinary computing power, we simplify by 
assuming the same distribution of payments across time for all participants. Following some of the 
studies, Table 6 in Appendix 1 shows that about half of the payments occur in the 4 morning hours, 
20% in the 4 early afternoon hours and 30% in the 4 evening hours. The two humps in the morning 
and in the afternoon are clearly visible in Figure 5. 
 


















































































Source: Author’s own representation 
 
                                                      
14 Especially the high-value payments are concentrated in the late afternoon. 18
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In addition to the flow data or transaction data, another important component of payments data is the 
stock data. Besides (starting) account balances, this may include, for example, bilateral credit limits 
and collateral availability. For the sake of our analysis, we simplify to only two parameters, the 
starting balance and the intraday credit limits. All starting balances are set to zero, so the liquidity 
needs to be provided via intraday credit limits. There are two limiting levels of liquidity, the minimum 
and the maximum liquidity levels: 
• Minimum liquidity = participant holds enough liquidity at the end of the day to settle all 
payments at the end of the day, net after receiving payments. 
• Maximum liquidity = participant holds the full liquidity necessary to settle all transactions 
during the day immediately irrespective of incoming payments, i. e. the sum of all outgoing 
payments.
15 
Both levels are independent of the order of payments during the day and could in reality therefore 
quite easily be approximated ex-ante by the participants or the provider based on historical data. The 
assumption is made that participants do not actively manage their liquidity during the day by injecting 
or extracting liquidity on their accounts (see also Heijmans (2009)). Empirically, liquidity levels are 
influenced by several institutional and behavioural factors. The opportunity cost of holding liquidity 
on payment system accounts can depend on: 
• Remuneration of liquidity holdings: the payment system provider may encourage participants 
to hold liquidity in the system, for example by offering outright intraday interest payments 
• Collateral availability: availability and quality of eligible collateral on participants’ books. 
• Collateral requirements: restrictiveness of the payment system provider in accepting collateral. 
Possible is the application of haircut scales or certain credit quality thresholds. 
• Convertibility of collateral: if the payment system provider offers other services than payment 
settlement to the participant, collateral may be flexibly used for the collateralisation of other 
service, such as longer term credit. 
• Technical arrangements: payment system provider may offer participants to hold 
collateral/liquidity in other (ancillary) systems, yet offer liquidity bridges, i. e. quick 
redistribution of liquidity across systems. Data on these liquidity holdings may be separate 
from the data of the system concerned and consequently, in particular when using historical 
data, the true availability of liquidity may be underestimated. 
                                                      
15 The concept of “maximum liquidity” deviates from the “upper bound liquidity” which is used in most of the literature (e. g. 
Heijmans (2009). The upper bound liquidity in the literature is also the liquidity which is necessary to settle all 
transactions immediately, but takes into account incoming payments, so it depends on the order of payments. This upper 
bound liquidity will be harder to identify for payment system participants than the maximum liquidity, as the order of the 
payment flow will be difficult to predict. It is therefore likely that for example cautious participants will put the 
maximum liquidity on their account at the beginning of the day. Our concept of “minimum liquidity” does, however 
correspond to the “lower bound liquidity” referred to in the literature. 19
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These factors may play a role in the fact that different studies seem to indicate very different average 
levels of liquidity holdings. For instance, Heijmans (2009) finds that in NL, historically available 
liquidity was far above upper bound liquidity at least for some participants, whereas Puhr and Schmitz 
(2009) report that for their sample in the Austrian Large Value Payment System Artis, liquidity 
holdings usually amount to only 50% of the total daily outgoing payments of participants. 
4. Simulations
The first step is the establishment of the benchmark simulation. For this, an RTGS system is defined 
with the following settings: 
• Entry algorithm: the basic entry algorithm settles incoming payments upon receipt, if 
sufficient liquidity is available on the concerned account or if the intraday credit limit permits 
it. If the payment cannot be settled upon receipt, the payment is queued. 
• Queue: payments which are queued are settled upon arrival of additional liquidity in first-in-
first-out (FIFO) order. 
• End: At the end of the day, yet unsettled payments are scheduled for the following day. 
In all simulations, all participants have a starting balance on their account of 0. In the benchmark 
simulation, their intraday credit limit with the payment system is set to the minimum, that is, to the net 
outgoing payments or to zero if the net outgoing payments are negative. The latter is the case if the 
participant receives more payment value than it sends, as credit limits cannot be negative. The 
consequence is that while at the end of the business day all payments of all participants will be settled, 
payments will be queued during the day. 
In the alternative scenarios, liquidity in the system is increased by setting the intraday credit limits 
with the payment system to different levels between the minimum and the maximum liquidity, that is, 
to the total sum of all outgoing payments. 
 
( ) ( ) 1 0 , ) ( ) ( ) ( ≤ ≤ − ⋅ + = α α Min P Max P Min P P L L L L  
 
The variable Į designates different liquidity requirement levels. These liquidity levels would not 
necessarily need to be implemented by this simple rule, which does not exist in reality, to our 
knowledge. Yet also in reality, liquidity requirements will depend in one way or another on the size of 
the participant.
16 It is assumed that the participants need to fully collateralise the increased credit limit 
so that participants will incur a cost. The increase in the liquidity requirement could be the 
consequence of a decision by the payment system provider or the overseer, for example, in order to 
                                                      
16 In real payment systems run by central banks, such as Fedwire or TARGET2, liquidity requirements may be derived, e. g. 
as composed of minimum reserve balances and clearing balance requirements (Afonso and Shin (2008)). 20
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reduce liquidity risk in the system. Other ways of determining the amount of increased liquidity would 
be possible instead of increasing liquidity to a certain percentage between the minimum and the 
maximum liquidity, which is dependent on the payment traffic. For instance, all participants could be 
required to post the same amount of liquidity, irrespective of their importance, or they could be 
expected to raise liquidity related to specific payments, relative to their balance sheet, their risk 
properties or their capital share in the payment system if they are owners. 
Figure 6 shows the trade-off curves between credit limits, i. e. liquidity requirements Į, (on the x-axis) 
and queue lengths, i. e. payment delays, (on the y-axis) as averages for each group of participants. As 
measurement for the payment delay, we use the average queue duration for queued payments, which 
equals the total queuing time for each queued payment divided by the total number of queued 
payments.
17 The curve is much steeper for the large participants than for the small participants. The 
lines are based on the twelve simulations performed, namely at the 0%, 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, 90%, 95%, 99% and 100% levels. They are not smooth, because the average payment delay can 
depend significantly on whether individual payments can be made or not. This is true in particular for 
the smaller participants since they only make a few payments, which can significantly alter the 
average payment delay of the group of small participants. Thus the lines can only indicate the rough 
direction of the trade-off curves. 
 






































































































































Note: Average queue duration for queued payments (total queuing time for each queued payment divided by the total number of queued payments).   
Source: Author’s own representation 
 
                                                      
17 The intraday pattern of the queue is shown in Appendix 2. 21
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The scales on both ordinate and abscissa are different in the figure above. For instance, for large 
participants, maximum liquidity equals approximately 16,000,000 while the minimum equals 
approximately 400,000, thus the maximum is 40 times the minimum. This ratio is far lower for the 
small participants at about 25. For better comparison, the axes are thus standardised in Figure 7. For 
each group of participants, each data point’s coordinates are re-calculated as percentages of their 
respective maxima (for the credit limit on the x-axis as a percentage of the maximum of the interval 
Figure 6 for each group. 
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Source: Author’s own representation 
From Figure 7 it becomes clear that the effect of raising liquidity requirements (credit limits) will be 
different for each group of participants, depending on the interval, in which this raise take place. In an 
environment with very low liquidity (on the left side of the figure), a small increase in liquidity will 
strongly decrease the payment delay of large participants, but less so for the small and medium 
participants. If there is high liquidity already, for instance at the 40% point on the x-axis, a further 
increase will only reduce the payment delays incurred by the small participants, as the other two 
groups have already reduced their delays to 0. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the highest 
average payment delay incurred by large participants is less than four minutes (see Figure 6 left-hand), 
while for small participants it is about 50 minutes. Thus it is difficult to assess the overall effect of 
changing liquidity requirements by participant group, without assumptions about the utility functions. 
between maximum and minimum). For convenience, the curves are coloured in the same way as in 22
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In the remainder of this section, it will be shown that the utility participants derive from changes in the 
liquidity requirements will be different. Participants are faced with the choice between two negatives 
or “bads” (as opposed to “goods”): liquidity requirement and payment delay. As in traditional 
microeconomics, they will be indifferent between some combinations of these two “bads”. The 
combinations from which participants derive the same utility form an iso-utility or indifference curve. 
In a two-dimensional representation with each of the “bads” on one axis, these indifference curves are 
assumed to be concave with respect to the origin as both payment delay and liquidity requirements are 
perceived as cost by the participants. 
In Figure 8 the participants’ stylised type-dependent indifference curves are derived, starting with a 
medium participant in the top-left quadrant. The marginal rate of substitution between the two “bads“ 
(additional delay and additional liquidity requirement), the slope of the indifference curves is negative, 
while the slope of the marginal rate of substitution is positive,
18 which yields the concave form with 
respect to the origin, which is the optimum here. The scale of the axes is given by the minimum and 
maximum of payment delay and liquidity requirement, not the absolute values. This standardisation 
leads to differently shaped indifference curves. 100% on the y-axis correspond to 4 minutes for the 
large participants, 22 minutes for medium-sized participants and 50 minutes for small participants. 
Thus, even if the utility functions are the same for each group, the point with the coordinates 100% 
payment delay and 0% liquidity requirement (minimum liquidity), will be less beneficial for small 
participants than for large ones. Likewise, 100% on the x-axis mean 25 times minimum liquidity for 
small participants but 40 times the minimum for large participants. Thus large participants will derive 
lower utility from this combination than small ones. 
• As a consequence, compared to the indifference curves of medium participants, those of small 
participants (top-right quadrant) will be rotated counter-clockwise and look flatter as they have a 
higher aversion to payment delay. The path of optima (dotted arrow) will be flatter, indicating that 
the effect of payment delay changes on utility will be higher than that of liquidity requirement 
changes. 
• The indifference curves of large participants (bottom-left quadrant) will be rotated clockwise and 
look steeper, as they will have higher aversion towards additional liquidity requirements compared 
to the medium participants. The path of optima (dotted arrow) will be steeper, indicating that the 
effect of liquidity requirement changes on utility will be higher than that of payment delay 
changes. 
 
                                                      
18 The second derivative is negative. This implies that if the participant is facing very high liquidity requirement, even a small 
decrease will raise her utility more than the same decrease would if the participant were already at a very low level of 
liquidity requirement. 23
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Figure 8: Indifference curves 
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Source: Author’s own representation 
 
 
We combine the findings in Figure 7 and Figure 8 in Figure 9. If the liquidity holding decision is left 
to each participant, each will choose the combination which yields the highest utility. Graphically, this 
will be the point, where the trade-off curve is tangential to the indifference curve which is the closest 
to the origin. The graph reveals an interesting finding: As expected, large participants will be closest to 
the origin, i. e. the optimum with minimum liquidity and zero payment delay. This is due to economies 
of scale. However, the three types of participants will also favour different liquidity requirements (on 
the x-axis), as the large ones will prefer low requirements and the small ones are high requirements. 
The indifference curves will be tangential to the trade-off curves at different points, due to their 
rotation, but also due to the different shapes of the trade-off curves. A liquidity saving feature 
proposed by a payment system provider may thus have an unequal effect on the utility the payment 
system offers to different participant types, which should be taken into account by overseers assessing 
the consequences of proposed changes. The choice of the liquidity requirement may have an impact on 
the competitive position of the participant groups. 
 24
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Source: Author’s own representation 
 
For the operator of the payment system, knowledge of this possibly asymmetric effect of the design 
change is important, not least because they may have to be taken account of in the pricing scheme. The 
design of the system will influence the behaviour of the participants and ultimately decide which type 
of entities will participate in the system (Fujiki et al. (2008)), making it vital from a business point of 
view to know about the consequences. For the oversight function, such analysis of the effects on the 
competitive situation of the participants is currently not foreseen in relevant frameworks, such as the 
Core Principles for systemically important payment systems of the of the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS). None of the CPSS (2001) core principles refers explicitly to the effects of 
payment system design on the competitive situation. Core principle IX, which calls for systems to 
have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access, 
could be interpreted as opening a door for this kind of analysis, since certain design features might be 
interpreted as “hidden” obstacles to fair access. However, the current implementation guidelines do 
not foresee this and indeed competition issues could be left to the competent authorities, not central 
banks’ payment system oversight functions. Yet the analysis shows that the recommendations and 
decisions of the oversight function itself may have an impact on the competitive situation. If the 
overseer decides to recommend a raise in the liquidity requirements in order to decrease liquidity risks 
in a system, this may well give an advantage to a certain group of participants over another. In the 
analysis above, small participants would be more likely to benefit from this, depending on what the 
starting point would be. 25
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5. Conclusion
Simulations of payment systems help operators design and maintain a payment system in compliance 
with the targeted clients’ needs and help overseers make informed assessments of the overseen 
infrastructure by enabling them to analyse the effect of changes in the complex technical environment. 
They can help compare across systems or analyse the effect of changes to a system, and enhance the 
general preparedness of overseers and operators as well as the foundations of decisions on concrete 
proposed measures of payment system providers, participants or overseers. 
A major challenge for researchers in the field is the availability of transaction-level data, which is 
necessary to conduct the simulations. Access to historical data is mostly restricted and confidential and 
can therefore not be freely used for discussion and publication. The use synthetically generated data, 
as in this paper, avoids this problem. In addition, the data generation process is known to the 
researcher and does not include hidden behavioural assumptions or noise due to events outside the 
system, unless introduced by the researcher. 
In the concrete case of this paper, the effects of changing liquidity requirements on different types of 
participants have been analysed. Besides the expected effect that more liquidity in the system will 
reduce payment delays and therefore liquidity and credit risk, there is an asymmetric effect on the 
participants. For example, over much of the relevant interval, large participants will receive no benefit 
from increasing liquidity requirements. If the liquidity requirement is higher than what would be 
necessary to ensure zero payment delay, the large participants would only have to post more 
liquidity/collateral. The small participants, on the other side, are very likely to benefit from the 
additional liquidity requirement, since their payment delays will still reduce over much of the relevant 
interval. 
The simulations show that there may be an impact on the competitive situation of the participants by a 
change in the design of the system. This competitive impact could not be identified easily without the 
simulations. For operators, the assessment of the impact may be a business issue, but it may also have 
significant policy implications for the oversight function. Competitive consequences are not covered 
explicitly by any of the Committee on Payment and Settlement System’s 2001 “Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems”. One might interpret core principle IX as relevant, because 
it could be seen as covering open discrimination against access of certain participants as well as 
implicit (or “hidden”) disadvantages to certain participants within the system. This would be similar to 
international trade policy where the concepts of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are seen as 
inhibitions to trade. 
The results of simulations depend critically on the employed data set, whether this is data of real 
transactions or synthetic data. In this paper, the data set consists of synthetically generated data, which 
has the advantage of having full information on the data-generating process, including any behavioural 
assumptions made. However, depending on the proposed analysis, the calibration of the data 
generation process will critically influence the results. The data generation process employs 26
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assumptions which are realistic for many payment systems. This is true for the concentration ratio, the 
timing of payments, average size and volume of payments between different types of participants. On 
the other hand, there are less realistic assumptions. For instance, payments from one participant to 
another will not always have the same size and size may depend on the timing of the payment. Also, 
the timing may be different for the various participants. 
Further research can immediately follow a number of directions, based on this paper: 
• Refined calibration of the data generation process: The refinement of the calibration of the data 
generating process may be one of the avenues for future research. This includes both more 
analysis of the distributions of payment sizes, volumes and timing patterns between different types 
of participants. Variations of the data generation with different participant communities and 
behaviour should also follow. 
• Determining alternative liquidity need vs. payment delay trade-off curves: With respect to the 
specific scenario of increasing liquidity, alternative requirements could be simulated, such as an 
increase related to the capital share or balance sheet size of the participants. 
• Effects of pricing structure: The pricing structure may affect the payment patterns of participants. 
From the above analysis it is clear that participants with high volumes and low average payment 
values achieve higher utility levels, yet pricing structures may set different incentives. 
• Studying effect of changes in the design of the system: The current paper uses a very simple 
RTGS system. More research on the effect of more complex structural characteristics of payment 
systems, such as settling algorithms or bilateral limits could be executed conveniently with the 
existing data sets. 
• Application to real transaction data: The application of the analysis to real payment transaction 
data, would be reveal the real beneficiaries of the current and alternative structural settings of 
payment systems. 
• Liquidity is assumed to be costly to participants since collateral has to be pledged. However, it 
would need to be further investigated why in some systems liquidity is so abundant that even the 
maximum liquidity level is exceeded. 27
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Appendix 1: Intraday distribution of payments 
Table 6 Distribution of payments over time 
Introduction time 
(volume) 





07:00 – 08:00  2,053  410  192  2,655 
08:00 – 09:00  1,897  332  170  2,399 
09:00 – 10:00  1,783  349  174  2,306 
10:00 – 11:00  1,886  335  163  2,384 
11:00 – 12:00  882  153  64  1,099 
12:00 – 13:00  1,002  170  68  1,240 
13:00 – 14:00  758  117  52  927 
14:00 – 15:00  776  127  75  978 
15:00 – 16:00  1,128  213  94  1,435 
16:00 – 17:00  1,135  211  99  1,445 
17:00 – 18:00  1,109  200  101  1,410 
18:00 – 19:00  1,368  231  123  1,722 
Grand Total  15,777  2,848  1,375  20,000 
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Appendix 2: Intraday queue pattern 
For illustration, the following graph shows the development of submitted payments, settled payments 
and queued payments per hour, for the case of minimum liquidity. It can be seen that the queue is very 
large in the beginning of the day in value and in volume terms and decreases over the day. In the 
afternoon, when payment activity picks up again, the queue only builds up moderately as some 
participants have built up liquidity during the day. 
 
































































































Source: Author’s won representation 29
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